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351 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE 
MARCELLUS SHALE: 
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE 




On New Year’s Day, 2009, in the small town of Dimock, 
Pennsylvania, Norma Fiorentino’s water well exploded.1  Other 
residents of the same community observed that their water was 
discolored and that it would bubble, foam, or give off odors.2  
Testing by the state Department of Environmental Protection 
revealed that nearby drilling for natural gas had exposed the 
aquifer to methane.  The drinking water of at least nine homes 
was contaminated.  Four were at risk of exploding.3  In 2009, as 
industrial drilling for natural gas began in earnest, more than a 
dozen accounts of drinking water polluted by toxic contaminants 
surfaced throughout Dimock.4 
Dimock is one of hundreds of local jurisdictions in the 
Northeast that has seen a dramatic increase in recent years of a 
process of drilling for natural gas known as hydraulic fracturing, 
 
† J.D. Candidate, June 2012, St. John’s University School of Law; B.F.A., 2003, 
University of North Carolina School of the Arts. Winner of the NYSBA 
Environmental Law Section’s 2011 Prof. William R. Ginsberg Memorial Essay 
Contest. Great thanks to Professors Mary L. Lyndon and Robert A. Ruescher for 
their invaluable input and direction, and to the DEC’s Jennifer L. Maglienti, Esq., 
for her feedback. 
1 Laura Legere, Nearly a Year After a Water Well Explosion, Dimock Twp. 





4 Id. Pennsylvania has experienced six documented explosions caused by 
migrating gas in the last decade, killing four people. Contamination has affected at 
least 60 water wells, including three municipal water supplies. Id.  
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or “fracking.”5  This “gas rush” is the result of a confluence of 
recent events, including high energy prices, economic recession, 
state budgetary shortfalls, and industry exemption from federal 
regulation, to name a few.  Chiefly, it stems from the 
advancement of fracturing technology to allow for increased gas 
extraction from tightly-packed formations of shale.6  The gas 
extraction industry has accelerated development of a formation 
known as the Marcellus Shale Play, a large, subterranean 
formation that stretches from the Southeastern corner of Ohio 
through West Virginia, Northwestern Pennsylvania, and into the 
Catskill Mountain region of New York State.7 
As the development by natural gas extractors of the nearby 
West Virginia and Pennsylvania Marcellus increased, a debate 
began about the practical implications of hydraulic fracturing in 
New York State.  Proponents of the practice point to studies 
concluding that hydraulic fracturing does not pose a significant 
threat to drinking water supplies.8  They emphasize the potential 
benefits of the practice, noting that natural gas development 
could provide a desperately needed economic boost to a 
chronically depressed region within a state suffering from 
historic budget shortfalls.9  It could also bring a cheap, clean 
source of energy to the nearby power-hungry metropolitan areas 
of New York and Philadelphia.10  Opponents counter with 
numerous anecdotal accounts of poisoned wells, flammable tap-
water, and deteriorating health in communities across the 
 
5 See Abrahm Lustgarten, New York’s Gas Rush Poses Environmental Threat, 
PRO PUBLICA (July 18, 2008, 2:42 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/new-yorks-
gas-rush-poses-environmental-threat-722. 
6 Id. 
7 See generally J. DANIEL ARTHUR, ET AL., WATER RESOURCES AND USE FOR 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE REGION (2011), available at 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/ENVreports/FE0000797_ 
WaterResourceIssues.pdf. 
8 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF 
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS ch. 4, at 19 (2004) [hereinafter 
EPA IMPACT STUDY], available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic 
fracturing/wells_coalbedmethanestudy.cfm. 
9 See Mireya Navarro, Gas Drilling is Severely Restricted in Catskill Watershed 
Supplying New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A15.  
10 See Navarro, supra note 9.  
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country where the common factor is a local increase in fracking.11  
They note particularly that the Marcellus Shale formation lies 
deep underneath the Catskill watershed, which supplies drinking 
water to over 9 million people in the Greater New York City 
area.12  Due to the high quality of that watershed, the City is able 
to provide unfiltered water directly from upstate, saving the 
billions of dollars it would otherwise be forced to spend on 
filtration.13  Contamination of the Catskill watershed, fracking 
opponents argue, would be catastrophic.14 
Faced with the conflict between pressure to develop one of 
the world’s largest natural gas fields and equal pressure to 
protect one of its most vital sources of drinking water, the New 
York State Senate chose to err on the side of caution.  In August 
of 2010 the State Senate passed a bill suspending the issuance of 
new permits for hydraulic fracturing in the Marcellus Shale 
formation in order to “continue the review and analysis of the 
effects of hydraulic fracturing on water and air quality, 
environmental safety and public health.”15  The Governor vetoed 
the legislation, but enacted a narrower moratorium by Executive 
Order.16  The Order prohibited the issuance of permits for “high-
volume, horizontal hydraulic fracturing” until July 1, 2011.17  
The ban has since remained in place pending the further revision 
of State regulations.18 
Barring further action by the legislature or the Governor’s 
office, fracking in the New York Marcellus will soon be a reality.  
Should the ban on the practice be lifted, it will be regulated 
 
11 See Clifford Krauss & Tom Zeller, Jr., When a Rig Moves in Next Door, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at BU1. 
12 See Navarro, supra note 9. 
13 Id. 
14 See Sandy Long, America’s Most Endangered River: the Upper Delaware, 
RIVER REPORTER (June 3, 2010), http://www.riverreporter.com/issues/10-06-
03/head1-endangered.html. 
15 N.Y.S. 8129B, 233d Sess. (2010). 
16 Tom Zeller, Jr., New York Governor Vetoes Fracking Bill, N.Y. TIMES GREEN 
BLOG (Dec. 11, 2010, 7:35 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/new-york-
governor-vetoes-fracking-bill. 
17 Id.  
18 Governor Andrew Cuomo’s office described reports that it would seek to 
reinstate the practice of fracking in July 2011 as “baseless speculation and 
premature.” Edith Honan & Joan Gralla, New York Seeks To Lift Fracking 
Moratorium, REUTERS (June 30, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/06/30/natgas-newyork-fracking-idUSN1E75T16420110630. For more on the 
revision of New York’s regulations, see infra, Part I.C.1. 
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under New York State law.19  This Note explores the regulatory 
framework currently in place in the state and tests it against 
several issues of practical application evident from the 
experiences of other states that have dealt with the matter.20   
The statute governing regulation of the hydraulic fracturing 
process in New York State contains a number of internal 
contradictions.  The statute states its policy goals as follows: 
first, to regulate the development of oil and gas “in such a 
manner as will prevent waste”; second, to develop properties “in 
such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas 
may be had”; and third, to protect fully “the correlative rights of 
all owners and the rights of all persons including landowners and 
the general public.”21  The policy objectives listed illustrate the 
overarching contradiction contained in the statute:  The state 
may choose to prevent waste and thereby achieve a greater 
recovery of oil and gas, or it may choose to protect fully the rights 
of all persons.  It cannot do both at once.  The conflicts between 
the statute’s stated policies are illustrated by examining three 
main subjects.   
First, limiting the statutory definition of “waste” to only the 
physical waste of oil and gas fails to account for the overall 
impact and resource expenditure of excess drilling.  Second, the 
New York statute does not sufficiently address likely conflicts of 
interest between lease-holders and property owners, both of 
whom hold correlative rights in produced gas.  Specifically, the 
statute is inconsistent on two issues: first, the inevitable question 
of whether fracking constitutes a trespass on—or rather under—
another’s land; and second, the tension between the rights of 
landowners and the State’s policy of compulsory integration of  
 
 
19 See infra, Part I.B. 
20 This Note does not seek to advocate for or against the utilization of this 
method by the fossil fuel extraction industry in New York State, nor to question the 
wisdom of the exemption of the fracking process from federal regulation. These 
subjects have been, and will no doubt continue to be, discussed at length by other 
commentators. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic 
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need To Revisit Regulation, 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115 (2009); Laura C. Reeder, Note, Creating a Legal 
Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale 
Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 999 (2010); Aaron Stultz 
Heishman, Recent Development, Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 23 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 561 (2010). 
21 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011). 
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property to facilitate a greater recovery of gas.  Lastly, the 
statute fails to delineate clearly the rights of the municipalities 
that most directly represent the local public.   
In the interest of maximizing the efficacy of the law’s stated 
policy objectives—a greater recovery of gas, protection of the 
correlative rights of property owners, and the full protection of 
the rights of all persons, including producers and the general 
public22—and minimizing the need for court action in addressing 
potential conflicts, this Note concludes by recommending the 
following discrete amendments to the current regulatory 
framework.  First, the legislature should adopt a more 
comprehensive definition of waste that includes environmental 
waste and disposal.  Second, legislators must reconcile the 
conflict between landowners’ rights and the practice of 
compulsory integration in one of two ways: either by recognizing 
that the rights of landowners are subservient to the state’s 
interest in facilitating the recovery of gas, or by preserving the 
right of landowners to keep their land free from industrial 
drilling and ending the practice of compulsory integration.  
Third, legislators should define the rights of operators on land 
compulsorily integrated under the present system.  Finally, 
recognizing that the municipality is the political entity most 
receptive to the will of the public at the local community level, 
the power of local governments to determine what procedures 
may be imposed on industry to safeguard their local resources 
must be made clear.  The state legislature should define the term 
“regulation” in Article 23’s supersession clause to specify how 
much control local governments may exercise over the location of 
drilling and the traffic to drilling sites. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Fracking: The Process 
Hydraulic fracturing allows for effective extraction in areas 
where conventional drilling would otherwise be inefficient and 
uneconomical.  Conventional drilling is achieved by the boring of 
a shaft into the ground until it taps a pool of oil or gas.  
 
22 Id. 
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Extraction continues until that pool is exhausted.23  But because 
of the extremely low natural permeability of shale, in a formation 
like the Marcellus, vast reserves of natural gas are effectively 
captured, bound up in the many stratified layers of rock, and 
unable to collect in large, unitary pools.24  A conventional well, 
therefore, can extract only a very limited amount of gas from the 
area beneath it.  Given the high cost of drilling, the extraction 
industry has understandably refrained from embarking on 
conventional drilling ventures likely to return only a meager 
yield.25   
The fracking process, on the other hand, provides a 
technological means of extracting gas from shale more efficiently.  
The process begins in much the same way as conventional 
drilling: the extractor bores a hole into the ground, but at a 
somewhat horizontal slope, cutting across a wide area of the 
shale formation rather than straight down into it.  Wells can 
extend laterally as far as 5,000 feet.26  The extractor then injects 
water treated with a mixture of chemicals and solid particles—
called propping agents or “proppants”27—into the well with high-
pressure pumps.  The pressure causes the rock to crack, allowing 
deeper penetration by the treated water and breaking the shale 
into small pieces.28  The chemical compounds with which the 
 
23 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-TR-0565, 
DRILLING SIDEWAYS—A REVIEW OF HORIZONTAL WELL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS 
DOMESTIC APPLICATION 1–2 (1993), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/petroleum/ 
tr0565.pdf. 
24 See, e.g., Marcellus Shale: The Enviormental Review Process for Natural Gas 
Exploration in the Marcellus Shale, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION 
[hereinafter Marcellus Shale], http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2012). 
25 The total costs of extraction, from exploration through to production, 
transport, storage, and distribution, are incredibly high and have increased over the 
last several decades. The nominal cost per natural gas well drilled in 2008 is nearly 
50 times what it was in 1960. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
DOE/EIA-0383(2009), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 112 fig.4.8 (2010), available at 
http://wilcoxen.maxwell.insightworks.com/pages/3427/oil-mdc-data.pdf. 
26 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., PRELIMINARY REVISED DRAFT: 
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, 
AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM ch. 5, at 24–25 (2011) [hereinafter 
PRDSGEIS], available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ogprdsgeisfull.pdf. 
27 Marcellus Shale, supra note 24. Common proppants include sand, resin-
coated sand, aluminum pellets, and man-made ceramics. A proppant is typically 
selected because its permeability is greater than the rock in the surrounding 
formation. 
28 Id. 
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water has been treated allow the proppant to congeal, forming 
fissures in the rock around the well.  These fissures cause the 
natural gas that would otherwise remain trapped in the shale to 
flow into the well where it can be extracted, stored, and 
ultimately transported for use in the energy market.29 
Although recovery of natural gas by hydraulic fracturing has 
been highly lauded by many industrialists and politicians as a 
cleaner energy alternative to coal and oil, as well as a key 
component of American energy independence,30 several 
environmental concerns cloud fracking’s “green energy” pedigree.  
Chief among these concerns is the fact that the fracking process 
requires the use of massive amounts of water.  Drilling a well can 
require as many as 600,000 gallons of water, and each frack of an 
individual well requires between 50,000 and 350,000 gallons of 
water.31  This water can be transported via pipeline, but is more 
often trucked to extraction sites.  Transporting this quantity of 
water requires the use of hundreds of tanker trucks for the 
drilling and initial frack of a single well.  Given that each well is 
likely to be fracked up to eighteen times before it is closed and 
abandoned, the amount of water consumed per well can exceed 
five million gallons.32  This level of water usage, along with the 
fuel expenditure and resultant emissions commensurate with the 
trucking of that water, thus gives the hydraulic fracturing 
process a significant environmental footprint. 
 
29 Id. 
30 The number of large shale plays in the United States, most notably the 
Bakken, Barnett, Montney, and Haynesville formations, have made the United 
States a world leader in natural gas production. See Natural Gas: An 
Unconventional Glut, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2010, at 12. This abundance has led 
some to call America “the Saudi Arabia of natural gas.” Joe McKendrick, America, 
the Saudi Arabia of Natural Gas, SMARTPLANET (Mar. 18, 2010, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.smartplanet.com/business/blog/business-brains/america-the-saudi-
arabia-of-natural-gas/5606. 
31 See Chesapeake Energy, Hydraulic Fracturing Facts: Water Usage, 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, http://www.hydraulicfracturing.com/Water-Usage/Pages/ 
Information.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
32 Id. Using the ranges provided by industry, the variance between the potential 
minimum and maximum amount of water usage is notable. Calculated using the 
numbers at the smaller end of the range, the minimum amount of water used over 
the life of a well is 965,000 gallons. The numbers from the higher end of the range, 
though, yield an estimated water usage of 6.9 million gallons of water for a single 
well. In the information it supplies to the public on the subject, New York’s 
Department of Environmental Conservation provides numbers decidedly nearer to 
the bottom of this range. Marcellus Shale, supra note 24 (“Each well may use more 
than one million gallons of water.”). 
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But the issue of the sheer amount of water—itself an 
increasingly scarce resource—that the fracking process requires 
is directly connected to a second key environmental concern: how 
to handle that volume of water after it has been used.  The 
extraction industry describes water that has been treated for 
hydraulic fracturing as produced water or “flowback.”33  Produced 
water contains both proppants and a chemical “cocktail”: a blend 
of chemical agents not typically disclosed to the public because 
extractors regard individual chemical blends as trade secrets.34  
Although the specific composition of many of these compounds is 
unknown, commonly used components include benzene and 
ethylene—known carcinogens.35  Fracking fluid is further 
contaminated during the pumping process because it is exposed 
to the methane gas that it is intended to help extract.36  
Extractors can recover between 68 and 82 percent of the water 
used in the drilling and fracturing processes, but the remainder 
of this produced water remains in the ground.37  Produced water 
thus creates two distinct environmental issues: first, the 
potential impacts of the unrecoverable water on the surrounding 
areas; and second, the question of how best to handle the water 
that has been recovered.   
The potential environmental and health impacts of 
unrecovered fracking fluid in deep shale formations are largely 
unknown.  In 2004, the EPA conducted a study of the practice of 
hydraulic fracturing in underground coal formations.  The study 
raised the possibilities of artificial fractures extending to an 
underground source of drinking water (“USDW”) or facilitating 
the movement of produced water through natural formations into 
a USDW as “scenarios . . . of potential concern.”38  The EPA 
 
33 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 98. 
34 Abrahm Lustgarten, Buried Secrets: Is Natural Gas Drilling Endangering 
U.S. Water Supplies?, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 13, 2008, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/buried-secrets-is-natural-gas-drilling-endangering-
us-water-supplies-1113 (“ ‘It is like Coke protecting its syrup formula for many of 
these service companies[.]’ ” (quoting Scott Rotruck, Vice President of Corporate 
Development at Chesapeake Energy)). 
35 On benzene, see U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Testing Status Benzene 
10389-Y, NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid= 
BCB630F7-123F-7908-7BB1B8384496F5B8 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) ; on ethylene, 
see id. at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/profiles/EthyleneOxide.pdf. 
36 EPA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 15, 17. 
37 Id. ch. 4, at 15–16. 
38 Id. ch. 3, at 5–6. 
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concluded, though, that “the injection of hydraulic fracturing 
fluids into coalbed methane wells poses little or no threat to 
USDWs” and that “[a]lthough potentially hazardous chemicals 
may be introduced into USDWs when fracturing fluids are 
injected into coal seams that lie within USDWs, the risk posed to 
USDWs by introduction of these chemicals is reduced 
significantly by groundwater production and injected fluid 
recovery . . . .”39  Still, the EPA did not rule out the potential for 
contamination of drinking water sources by fracking fluids.  
Rather, the Agency’s study concluded only that among the 
incidents of drinking water contamination, the study found no 
“confirmed evidence that drinking water wells have been 
contaminated by hydraulic fracturing fluid injection.”40  
Recognizing the acute toxicity of at least one common additive to 
fracking fluid—diesel fuel—the Agency “reached an agreement 
with the major service companies to voluntarily eliminate diesel 
fuel from hydraulic fracturing fluids that are injected directly 
into USDWs for coalbed methane production.”41 
The environmental and health impacts of produced water 
that has been recovered, though also largely untested, are 
potentially even more profound.  Unlike the fracking fluid that 
remains underground, often thousands of feet beneath potential 
drinking water sources, produced water that is recovered must be 
stored above ground until transportation to a long-term storage 
or treatment facility can be arranged.42  One common method 
used by the industry is the storage of produced water in open 
containment pits or tanks, where it awaits trucks to carry it 
away.43  Potential for spillage or leakage into the surrounding 
environment is high any time the water is moved from one 
location to another.44  Due to the interconnectedness of water 
systems, spills or leaks of produced water can easily travel 
significant distances and ultimately affect drinking water, as 
well as animal and plant life, far from the drilling site.45 
 
39 Id. ch. 7, at 5. 
40 Id. ch. 7, at 6.  
41 Id. ch. 7, at 5. 
42 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 98–99, 118, 120, 123, 130–31. 
43 See Galen Sanford, ‘Produced’ Water an Economic Opportunity, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (May 13, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/produced-
water-an-economic-opportunity/.  
44 See EPA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 8, ch. 4, at 16. 
45 Id. 
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In addition to water use and contamination concerns, gas 
wells utilizing the fracking process pose potential problems to air 
quality as well.  During production, some gaseous hydrocarbons 
change state and become a liquid, referred to as condensate.46  
Tanks collecting condensate on drilling sites vent benzene, 
toluene, xylene, and ethylbenzene into the air.  Because the 
vapors of these hydrocarbons are heavier than air, they can 
accumulate in the surrounding areas.47  Prolonged exposure to 
significant quantities of the vented hydrocarbons can lead to 
serious health effects, including irreversible nerve damage.48 
B. General Regulatory Structure 
The regulation of the recovery of natural gas by underground 
injection of fluids is solely within the purview of the state where 
the drilling operation is conducted.  Before 2005, the process was 
subject to federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
with the EPA providing states with minimum requirements for 
underground injection control (“UIC”) programs.49  A state 
retained primary regulatory authority of the activity unless the 
EPA determined that its UIC program did not meet those 
minimum requirements, which included inspection, monitoring, 
and record-keeping standards as well as prohibitions against 
state agencies authorizing any rule that endangered drinking 
water sources.50  But in 2005, the Safe Drinking Water Act was 
amended by Congress specifically to exempt from the definition 
of underground injection the “underground injection of fluids or 
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic 
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production 
activities.”51  Since this amendment, regulation of fracking for oil 
or gas production has been the exclusive domain of state 
authorities. 
 
46 See, e.g., Sources of Oil and Gas Pollution, EARTHWORKS, 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/airpollutionsources.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
47 Id. 
48 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 35. 
49 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). 
50 Id. at 1264; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a)-(b) (2006). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1). 
WF_Siler (Do Not Delete) 12/3/2012  12:46 PM 
2012] HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 361 
C. New York’s Regulatory Scheme 
1. Statutory Underpinnings 
Regulation of the natural gas drilling industry in New York 
is governed by Article 23 of the Environmental Conservation 
Law.  That statute commits to the state Department of 
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) the authority to 
promulgate rules overseeing the development and 
implementation of natural gas extraction, treatment, and 
transportation.52  As discussed above, DEC regulations are meant 
to provide for development according to several stated policy 
objectives: first, to prevent waste; second, to provide for a greater 
recovery of gas; third, to protect fully the correlative rights of all 
owners; and finally, to protect fully the rights of all persons 
including landowners and the general public.53   
The DEC’s regulations, in turn, are subject to certain 
requirements contained in New York’s State Environmental 
Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”).54  SEQRA requires that state 
agencies consider the environmental impact of any activity 
subject to discretionary approval before issuing a permit.55  Thus, 
when an action is deemed to have a potentially significant 
impact, the DEC is required to draft an Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”).  Once a draft EIS is available, it must be 
posted for a comment period of at least thirty days, allowing the 
public to voice any potential concerns to agency decision makers 
and project sponsors.56 
Rather than consider each activity’s environmental impact 
on a case by case basis, the DEC has standardized its 
assessments through two mechanisms: the Environmental 
Assessment Form (“EAF”) and the Generic Environmental 
Impact Statement (“GEIS”).  The EAF allows permit applicants 
to provide the DEC with the details of a specific proposed 
activity’s estimated environmental impact rather than requiring 
agency analysis of every proposal.57  A GEIS allows the DEC to 
 
52 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305(8) (McKinney 2011). 
53 Id. § 23-0301. 
54 See id. §§ 3-0301(1)(b), (2)(m), 8-0113. 
55 See N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 617.7 (2011). 
56 See id. 
57 See ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0109(2); Defreestville Area Neighborhoods Ass’n v. 
Town Bd., 299 A.D.2d 631, 632–34, 750 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166–67 (3d Dep’t 2002); see 
also N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 617.9 (2011); SEQR: Environmental Impact 
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complete one EIS for an entire class of activities, rather than 
demanding a separate EIS for each individual proposal within 
the class.58  Public comment period is solicited once, prior to the 
adoption of the GEIS, rather than prior to the issuance of each 
individual permit.59  Once released, the GEIS covers virtually all 
projects within the class.   
Until recently, proposed gas wells in New York were covered 
by a GEIS promulgated in 1992.  The 1992 GEIS determined that 
the issuance of a standard individual oil or gas well drilling 
permit anywhere in the state, when no other permits are 
involved, was a “non-significant action” under SEQRA.60  In 2008, 
anticipating increased instances of horizontal drilling and high-
volume hydraulic fracturing in the State, the DEC determined 
that these practices warranted further review.61  The DEC 
resolved to develop a Supplemental GEIS (“SGEIS”) to address 
three key factors distinguishing these practices from more 
conventional drilling: “(1) required water volumes in excess of 
GEIS descriptions, (2) possible drilling in the New York City 
Watershed, in or near the Catskill Park, and near the federally 
designated Upper Delaware Scenic and Recreational River, and 
(3) longer duration of disturbance at multi-well drilling sites.”62  
A draft SGEIS was published in September of 2009.63  In 
response to additional research and extensive public comment on 
the draft, the DEC continued to revise the SGEIS through the 
summer of 2011.  A Preliminary Revised Draft SGEIS 
(“prdSGEIS”) was released in July of 2011,64 with a further 
revision released in September.65  As of this writing, the DEC has 
 
Assessment in New York State, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/357.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
58 N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 617.10.  
59 Id. 
60 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING 
REGULATORY PROGRAM § II.A, tbl.1(a) (July 1992), available at 
ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/geismaster.pdf. 
61 PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 1, at 4–5. 
62 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION 
MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM ch. 1, at 4 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 DSGEIS], 
available at ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/OGdSGEISFull.pdf. 
63 See generally id. 
64 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26. 
65 The Revised Draft SGEIS was issued on September 7, 2011, and was open for 
public comment until January 11, 2012.  See Marcellus Shale, N.Y. St. Department 
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not yet released a finalized version of the SGEIS.  For purposes 
of its analysis, this Note assumes that the prdSGEIS will be 
adopted without substantial alteration and that its terms will 
govern the issuance of permits for new hydraulic fracturing wells 
in the post-moratorium period.66  This Note does not pretend to 
possess the scientific expertise necessary to present an opinion 
on the sufficiency or efficacy of these measures.   
2. The Regulatory Life-Cycle of a Natural Gas Well67 
a. Birth: Permitting and Unitization 
The process of complying with New York State regulations to 
begin drilling for natural gas is relatively straightforward.  As a 
threshold matter, an operator must first demonstrate that it is a 
legitimate organization with adequate financial security,68 but 




of Envtl. Conservation, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html (last visited Oct. 
24, 2012). 
66 The draft SGEIS for high-volume hydraulic fracturing exempts a proposed 
fracking well from site-specific SEQRA determinations—and therefore from periods 
of comment by the local public—unless it falls within one of seven particular 
categories. Projects only require individual assessment where: (1) the target is 
shallower than 2,000 feet; (2) the target is less than 1,000 feet below the base of a 
known fresh water supply; (3) the proposal contains a centralized flowback water 
surface impoundment not previously approved; (4) the well pad is within 300 feet of 
a reservoir, stem, or controlled lake; (5) the well pad is within 150 feet of a private 
water well or other watercourse; (6) the project anticipates a significant reduction in 
the flow or habitat of nearby surface waters; or (7) the location is within 1,000 feet of 
subsurface water supply infrastructure. See 2009 DSGEIS, supra note 62, ch. 8, at 2–
3. Whether this limitation on allowing the public to comment on individual wells 
further compromises Article 23’s stated aim of fully protecting the rights of the 
public is too broad-reaching a question for this Note. 
67 The term “life-cycle” is used only as an analogy to present the reader with 
familiar stages of existence: birth, maturity, and death. In many ways, the term is 
inappropriate because gas wells do not share the characteristics of living things. 
They are not alive, nor are they part of any natural cycle. 
68 Well Permitting Process: Well Permitting Requirements To Drill, Deepen, Plug 
Back and Convert for Oil, Gas, Solution Salt Mining and Other Regulated Wells, 
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/ 
1772.html (last visted Apr. 16, 2012). An operator may demonstrate financial 
security by submitting a Bond form, letter of credit, or similar financial document. 
Financial Security, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1622.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Assuming that 
they maintain sufficient financial security, companies already on file with the DEC 
need not repeat this step with each and every application. 
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the operator must establish a “spacing unit” for the project.  Once 
the project is unitized, the operator may then apply to the DEC 
for a well permit.69 
The DEC defines a spacing unit as “the geographic area 
assigned to the well for the purposes of sharing costs and 
production.”70  The prdSGEIS provides three options for standard 
unitization of hydraulic fracturing wells, but anticipates that 
“multi-well pads”—spacing units that allow for the drilling of 
multiple horizontal wells—will be the most commonly utilized.71  
The prdSGEIS also allows for the drilling of additional wells from 
separate locations within a spacing unit “with justification.”72  
These are known as “infill” wells.73  The initial wellbore must be 
approximately centered in the spacing unit, and no wellbore 
inside the unit may be within 330 feet of a unit boundary.74  
Because the standards for spacing units were the subject of 
public comment in the generic EIS, no public comment period is 
necessary for the DEC to establish a new unit that conforms with 
those standards. 
As an alternative to the standard spacing requirements, the 
prdSGEIS allows for variances and non-conforming spacing units 
when such an allowance satisfies the policy objectives of Section 
23-0301—that is, preventing waste and achieving a greater 
recovery of gas.75  In the event that the DEC wishes to grant a 
permit to a non-conforming spacing unit, it must open the 
proposal for a period of public comment and, potentially, an 
adjudicatory hearing.76 
 
69 Drilling Permit Application, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1783.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
70 PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 17 n.16.  
71 Id. ch. 5, at 30. 
72 Id. ch. 5, at 24.  
73 Id. glossary, at 10. The drilling of infill wells is justified if “necessary to 
satisfy the policy objectives of section 23-0301.” N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-
0503(4) (McKinney 2011). The term “infill drilling” is understood in the industry to 
refer to the “[a]dd[ition of] new wells in an existing field . . . to accelerate recovery or 
to test recovery methods.” See, e.g., Infill Drilling Definition, OILGASGLOSSARY.COM, 
http://oilgasglossary.com/infill-drilling.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Presumably, 
then, a demonstration by the operator that an additional well would either 
accelerate recovery or achieve a greater recovery of gas is sufficient to justify 
additional drilling. See ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0301. 
74 ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0501(1)(b)(1)(vi). 
75 Id. § 23-0503(3)(a); PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 17. 
76 PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 24. 
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For a proposed spacing unit to be valid, the operator must 
control at least 60 percent of the acreage contained within it.77  
The remaining 40 percent—up to 256 acres—need not be 
controlled at the time of application.  This uncontrolled portion of 
the proposed unit may be brought under the operator’s control 
through the processes of voluntary or compulsory integration.78   
Once a proposed spacing unit has been established, the 
operator may proceed with the application process.  The 
application itself is just two pages long, requiring only the 
essential details concerning the proposed well, including its 
location, type, and target formation.79  Along with the 
application, the operator must submit a fee,80 as well as several 
supporting documents.  First, the operator must submit a survey 
map showing the proposed well’s location, the boundaries of the 
lease containing the well, and information on any wells nearby.  
The operator must also present a map showing the proposed 
spacing unit and an affirmation that it controls drilling rights in 
60 percent of that unit.  Finally, the operator must submit a 
document describing the proposed drilling program and a form 
assessing its likely environmental impact on the area.81  All of 
these documents are prepared by the applicant and, though the 
DEC inspects the service location to determine whether it is an 









77 ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0501(2). 
78 Id. § 23-0501(2)(b). The process of integration is discussed at length infra, 
Part II.B(2). 
79 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, APPLICATION FOR PERMIT TO 
DRILL, DEEPEN, PLUG BACK OR CONVERT A WELL SUBJECT TO THE OIL, GAS AND 
SOLUTION MINING LAW, available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_ 
minerals_pdf/dril_req.pdf. 
80 Drilling Permit Application, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1783.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). The amount of 
the fee due is dependent on the depth of the proposed well.   
81 Id. 
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specific testing prior to issuance of a permit.82  In the case of 
multi-well pads, the DEC may elect not to re-inspect the site 
prior to issuing a permit to drill a new well.83 
b. Adolescence and Maturity: Site Preparation and Operation 
Actual operation of a well is subject to more complex 
regulation including record-keeping and monitoring 
requirements, inspection, and testing for environmental 
compliance.  Under the prdSGEIS, any permit issued for 
hydraulic fracturing will be dependent on the operator meeting 
an elaborate set of conditions.84  At the outset, an operator must 
create a series of environmental impact plans, an emergency 
response plan, develop a road use agreement with the 
municipality, and properly prepare the site for industrial 
activity.85  A number of conditions require periodic compliance 
over the well’s lifetime.  For example, prior to any initial site 
disturbance or subsequent drilling, an operator must conduct 
tests of residential water wells within 1,000 feet of the well pad.  
These tests must be conducted by a certified commercial 
laboratory, not by the DEC, and must continue periodically until 
a year after the last fracking on the well pad occurs.86   
The prdSGEIS contains extensive regulations covering site 
maintenance, drilling, and stimulation—the process of actually 
fracking the well.87  Some of these regulations concern what 
materials are allowable to conduct a given activity.  For example, 
handling and containment of produced water on the well pad 
requires steel tanks,88 and only properly labeled biocides—
additives used to kill bacteria—may be used for any operation.89  
Other regulations prescribe specific procedural mandates for 
 
82 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 8, at 47–48. Discretionary activities require 
an environmental impact assessment in accordance with the State Environmental 
Quality Review (“SEQR”) and 6 NYCRR Pt. 617, but these assessments are now 
standardized through the required—and operator-prepared—Environmental 
Assessment Form. See SEQR: Environmental Impact Assessment in New York State, 
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/ 
357.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).  
83 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 8, at 47–48. 
84 See id. app. 10 at 1–13.  
85 Id. app. 10 at 1–3.  
86 Id. app. 10 at 2; id. ch. 7, at 46.  
87 See id. app. 10 at 3–11. 
88 Id. app. 10 at 10. 
89 Id. app. 10 at 6; see also id. glossary, at 1–2. 
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drilling and fracturing operations.  Required procedural 
conditions must be followed for the monitoring of the unused 
depth of fluid storage pits—known as “freeboard” monitoring90—
as well as the removal of fluids from those pits.91  Additional 
conditions mandate “[a]ppropriate pressure control procedures” 
during drilling92 and detailed procedures for the actual fracturing 
of a well.93  The operational regulations extend to record-keeping 
and reporting requirements.  Records must be kept of the site’s 
storm-water pollution protection plan (“SWPPP”),94 the adequacy 
of the well’s cement bond,95 all pressure tests conducted,96 all 
formations penetrated,97 and any fresh water, brine, oil, or gas 
encountered during drilling.98  Furthermore, the operator must 
maintain a detailed record of the hydraulic fracturing operation 
and that log must be available for inspection by the DEC upon 
request.99  This record must include “all types and volumes of 
materials, including additives, pumped into the well, flowback 
rates, and the daily and total volumes of fluid recovered during 
the first 30 days of flow from well.”100  Operators are required to 
report to the DEC before commencing surface casing cementing 
operations,101 before using any previously unreviewed chemical 
products,102 and upon the occurrence of “[a]ny non-routine 
incident.”103   
c. Death: Plugging and Abandonment 
Nor is terminating the operation of a well free from 
regulation.  An operator may not abandon a well, even 
temporarily, without notification to the DEC and compliance 
with agency regulations.104  When an operator wishes to plug and 
 
90 Id. app. 10 at 3; see also id. glossary, at 8. 
91 Id. app. 10 at 3.  
92 Id. app. 10 at 4.  
93 Id. app. 10 at 9–10.  
94 Id. app. 10 at 3. 
95 Id. app. 10 at 7–8.  
96 Id. app. 10 at 8. 
97 Id. app. 10 at 12. 
98 Id. app. 10 at 8. 
99 Id. app. 10 at 10. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. app. 10 at 7. 
102 Id. app. 10 at 8. 
103 Id. app. 10 at 12.  
104 See N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 555.3(a) (2011) (prohibiting 
temporary abandonment for a period longer than 90 days). 
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abandon a well permanently, it must provide the DEC with 
formal notice of its intention to abandon at least ten days in 
advance of commencing the procedure.  The DEC then issues a 
permit and arranges for a representative from the DEC to be 
present to witness the plugging.105  Before the drilling site may 
be abandoned legally, the operator must satisfy the DEC that the 
well has been plugged in accordance with DEC regulations, 
including that the well bore itself has been filled with cement 
“from total depth to at least 15 feet above the top of the 
shallowest formation from which the production of oil or gas has 
ever been obtained in the vicinity.”106 
Apart from closure of the well itself, the surrounding area 
must also be reclaimed according to DEC regulations.  The 
prdSGEIS specifies that the removal of fluids from the site must 
take place within forty-five days of the completion of 
operations.107  The operator must consult with the DEC before 
disposing of any cuttings containing chemical additives.108  
Finally, the prdSGEIS requires that the operator scarify the 
affected land to alleviate compaction before restoring, seeding, 
and mulching the topsoil.109 
The permit conditions and operational regulations listed 
above are non-exhaustive, but provide some idea of the scope and 
focus of the DEC’s regulatory structure and its emphasis on post-
permitting regulation, supervision, and reclamation. 
II. INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS & POLICY CONFLICTS 
Some of the contradictions inherent in New York’s natural 
gas mining statute are plain from a hard look at the statute 
itself.  Further contradictions become apparent when the 
regulatory framework is examined in the context of cases that 
have arisen in other states with practical experience in 
regulating high-volume hydraulic fracturing.  This Section will 
examine each of the statute’s stated policy aims, present several 
of the more illuminating cases, and enumerate the specific 
internal contradictions that they reveal in New York’s approach. 
 
105 Id. § 555.4(b). 
106 Id. § 555.5(a)(1). 
107 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, app. 10 at 11.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. app. 10 at 12. 
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A. Prevention of “Waste”   
The first stated policy objective of Article 23 of the 
Environmental Conservation Law is to regulate the production of 
gas “in such a manner as will prevent waste.”110  Article 23 
includes an explicit definition of “waste” that does not seem to 
extend to waste products or environmental waste.  Specifically, 
the Article’s definition is limited to “[p]hysical waste, as that 
term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry,” and 
waste which, through inefficiency, results in the loss of oil and 
gas that would otherwise be recoverable.111  Industry glossaries 
do not offer an indication of what might be meant by “physical 
waste,”112 but the remaining context of the Article strongly 
suggests that the definition is meant to be limited to either the 
actual, physical loss of oil and gas or the diminishment of 
potential recovery.  Article 23’s enforcement provision lists as its 
chief offense, quite succinctly, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
person to: 1. Waste oil or gas.”113  Title 21 of Article 23, New 
York’s codification of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and 
Gas, reinforces this understanding of the term.  It states that 
“[t]he purpose of this compact is to conserve oil and gas by the 




110 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011). 
111 Id. § 23-0101 (“Waste means a. Physical waste, as that term is generally 
understood in the oil and gas industry; b. The inefficient, excessive or improper use 
of, or the unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy; c. The locating, spacing, 
drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas well or wells in a 
manner which causes or tends to cause reduction in the quantity of oil or gas 
ultimately recoverable from a pool under prudent and proper operations, or which 
causes or tends to cause unnecessary or excessive surface loss or destruction of oil or 
gas; d. The inefficient storing of oil or gas; and e. The flaring of gas produced from an 
oil or condensate well after the department has found that the use of the gas, on 
terms that are just and reasonable, is, or will be economically feasible within a 
reasonable time.”); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES RULES & REGS. § 550.3(ax) (2011). 
112 See Oil & Gas, ALPHADICTIONARY.COM, http://www.alphadictionary.com/ 
directory/Specialty_Dictionaries/Oil_,038_Gas (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); see also 
Results for Waste Definition, OILGASGLOSSARY.COM, http://oilgasglossary.com/ 
?s=Waste (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
113 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1305(1) (McKinney 2011). 
114 Id. § 23-2101(1). 
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By contrast, the prdSGEIS developed by the DEC evidences 
a broader, more conventional understanding of the term waste.115  
It mandates disposal and treatment procedures for the cuttings 
created during drilling, the liner of storage pits, the millions of 
gallons of “flowback” or produced water, production brine, and 
solid residual waste.116  The 2009 draft SGEIS referenced studies 
by the Ground Water Protection Council (“GWPC”), an 
association of regulators in other states, whose findings on 
hydraulic fracturing waste disposal focus on produced water, not 
the physical waste of oil or gas.117  As the study indicates, 
“[a]pproximately 98% of all material generated from oil and gas 
[exploration and production] operations in the U.S. is produced 
water.”118   
The generation of produced water creates a number of 
environmental waste concerns.  Most obviously, the recovery, 
storage, and transport of produced water are highly susceptible 
to spillage.119  Spillage not only necessitates soil remediation in 
the area where the spill occurred, but also increases the risk of 
contamination of nearby water resources.120  But even when no 
spillage occurs, handling such large volumes of toxic material has 
a significant environmental impact.  Most particularly, there is 
the question of the final disposal of the produced water.  Some 
produced water is re-injected into deep underground disposal 
wells, where it can potentially affect sources of drinking water.121  
Much of the produced water, though, is sent to treatment 
 
115 Both definitions of “waste” should be distinguished from the term of art used 
in property law to describe acts which cause “an irreparable injury to the 
reversioner.” Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). Under 
traditional waste doctrine, total extraction of a valuable resource from the land by 
anyone but the landowner would always constitute waste. Because the 
Environmental Conservation Law seeks to allow gas-drilling lessors to extract as 
much of the resource as possible, the statute cannot mean to adopt this 
understanding of the term. For a detailed look at the evolution of waste doctrine in 
property law, see Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: 
A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006). 
116 PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 129–34. 
117 See 2009 DSGEIS, supra note 62, ch. 5, at 147 (citing GROUND WATER PROT. 
COUNCIL, ET AL., STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO 
PROTECT WATER RESOURCES (May 2009) [hereinafter GWPC REPORT], available at 
http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas% 
20Regulations%20Designed%20to%20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf). 
118 GWPC REPORT, supra note 117, at 30 (footnote omitted). 
119 PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 6, at 18. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. ch. 5, at 131. 
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facilities.  The sheer volume of water to be moved demands that 
hundreds of tanker trucks be employed to transport the waste 
generated in a single fracturing.  Purely in terms of the 
subsequent carbon dioxide emissions, this amount of traffic will 
leave a substantial environmental footprint over time.  
Unfortunately, potential problems do not stop after shipment.  
The capacity of waste that any one treatment facility may 
process is limited by the prdSGEIS, and a facility can be 
punished for accepting waste that exceeds its capacity or that 
contains chemicals it is not equipped to treat.122  Samples from 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia raise an additional concern that 
exposure to chemical additives and naturally-occurring elements 
of underground rock formations may render produced water 
untreatable by existing facilities.123   
Confronted with such large quantities of waste, New York 
facilities may either reach capacity or simply be unable to treat 
produced water effectively.  In such an eventuality, the disposal 
options that remain open to operators are unclear.  They may be 
forced to ship their produced water out of state for treatment or 
injection elsewhere.  Since much of the water will have been 
pumped out of fresh water sources within New York State, 
removing it from the local hydrologic cycle could significantly 
impact the State’s ecology.124  It is also possible that in the face of 
disposal difficulties operators will be tempted to discharge 
produced water directly into the environment in violation of DEC 
regulations.  Whatever the ultimate outcome, given the 
tremendous volume of produced water likely to be generated by 
extensive fracking in the New York Marcellus, the legislature 
should address the issue.  To ignore the ramifications of both 
solid and liquid waste products as a matter of policy by excluding 
them from the statutory definition of waste is a gross error. 
B. Correlative Rights & Rights of Landowners 
This Section will explore the related concepts of correlative 
rights and the rights of landowners.  It will begin by identifying 
these rights as they are generally understood and the methods 
 
122 Id. ch. 6, at 55, 59, 61. 
123 Id. ch. 6, at 56. 
124 See Robert B. Jackson et al., Water in a Changing World, ISSUES IN 
ECOLOGY, Spring 2001, at 1, 3–9, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/ 
wacademy/acad2000/pdf/issue9.pdf. 
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employed by the statute to protect them.  Contrasting New 
York’s approach with that of two other states, it will conclude 
that an inherent tension exists between these two policy aims 
and that the legislature should clarify for the courts which policy 
interest it believes to be paramount. 
1. Correlative Rights 
Correlative rights, the protection of which is Article 23’s 
second stated policy aim, are not explicitly defined in that 
Article.  The correlative rights doctrine is generally defined as 
one limiting the rights of landowners in a common underground 
source to a reasonable share, typically based on the amount of 
surface area owned by each.125  The term is perhaps most 
commonly used to refer to the rights of landowners in a common 
resource such as groundwater.  Each owner must limit his use of 
the resource to a proportional share, preventing one owner from 
draining the resource and depriving his fellow owners of its 
use.126   
In the context of gas extraction, this means that each 
landowner inside of a particular spacing unit is entitled to a 
share of the gas extracted from the entire unit in proportion to 
the amount of acreage owned, regardless of any single well’s 
productivity.  In theory, this practice protects the rights of an 
owner to the resource that lies under her land without requiring 
her to sink a new well and extract the gas herself. 
2. Rights of Landowners 
Article 23 claims as its next policy objective the full 
protection of “the rights of all persons including landowners.”127  
The methods chosen to achieve this objective, detailed in Titles 7 
and 9 of the Article, indicate that the rights referred to are, 
primarily, a landowner’s correlative rights as discussed above.  
Titles 7 and 9 provide, respectively, for the voluntary128 and 
compulsory129 integration and unitization of oil and natural gas 
pools and fields.  The first step in creating a spacing unit takes 
 
125 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (9th ed. 2009).  
126 Id. 
127 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011). 
128 Id. § 23-0701(1).  
129 Id. § 23-0901(1). 
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place at the time an operator applies for a permit to drill.130  For 
the spacing unit to be approved, the operator/applicant need 
control only 60 percent of the acreage contained within it.131  
Once a spacing unit has been established, owners of the separate 
interests within that unit may elect either to integrate interests 
voluntarily or, if “necessary to carry out the policy 
provisions . . . of this article,” by compulsion of the DEC.132  The 
specific policy provisions to which this section of the statute 
refers are not identified.  One must assume, since compulsion by 
its very nature indicates a limitation on a person’s right to 
refuse, that 23-0901 does not refer to the provision that claims to 
protect fully the rights of landowners.  The practice of 
compulsory integration reveals an inherent contradiction in 
Article 23.  The statute at once claims to protect landowners’ 
rights, but denies landowners the right to refuse to integrate 
their land into a spacing unit. 
Once compelled to join a spacing unit subject to drilling, a 
landowner’s rights are limited to the ability to choose between 
three options.  He may elect to become either an “[i]ntegrated 
participating owner,” an “[i]ntegrated non-participating owner,” 
or an “[i]ntegrated royalty owner.”133  If he elects to become a 
participating owner, he is responsible to pay his proportionate 
share of all costs associated with participation, including taxes 
and claims of third parties related to the well.134  If he elects 
instead to become a non-participating owner, he is still 
responsible for his proportionate share of the costs, but that 
share is reimbursed to the operator out of production proceeds 
rather than owed to the operator prior to the commencement of 
production.135  If he elects to become a royalty owner, he has no 
obligation to share the costs of the well, but he is still entitled to 
a royalty “equal to the lowest royalty . . . in the spacing unit, but 
no less than one-eighth.”136  Thus, the landowner’s rights 
protected by the statute are not the commonly understood rights 
 
130 See supra Part I.C(2)(a). 
131 ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0501(2). 
132 Id. § 23-0901(2). 
133 See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(1)–(3). 
134 See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(2), (3)(c)(1)(ii)(A). 
135 See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(1). A non-participating owner is also assessed a “risk 
penalty” of two-hundred percent of his share of actual costs. Id. 
136 See id. § 23-0901(3)(a)(3). An integrated owner who makes no election is 
deemed to be a royalty owner. 
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of fee-simple ownership, but are rather limited to the rights of a 
landowner to participate in a drilling operation and assert a 
claim for a proportional royalty under the correlative rights 
doctrine.  
It is clear from the terms of the statute that a landowner 
may not refuse to have her land integrated into a spacing unit.  
Less clear is what rights the statute grants to an operator over 
the land once that land has been integrated.  The practice of 
compulsory integration, in conjunction with the correlative rights 
doctrine, focuses primarily on sub-surface rights.  Still, the 
statute does not prohibit—and may be read explicitly to allow—
surface disturbances of integrated land.  Title 9 of Article 23 
provides that “[t]he well operator, on behalf of the owner, shall be 
entitled to conduct all acts associated with the well and 
necessary facilities related thereto.”137  Elsewhere, the statute 
describes the operations covered by an integration order as 
“including, but not limited to, the commencement, drilling, or 
operation of a well . . . upon any portion of a spacing unit.”138  As 
such, though it may not occur regularly in practice, an operator 
could theoretically drill on compulsorily integrated land against 
the landowner’s will and still be in statutory compliance.  Given 
the potential money to be made by extracting natural resources, 
theoretical loopholes in the regulatory structure can be expected 
to turn into practical transgressions, as demonstrated by the 
experiences of other states. 
3. The Fracking Pioneers: Correlative Rights & Landowners’ 
Rights in Texas and Oklahoma 
Where correlative rights are granted to individual 
landowners but large extraction companies dominate the market, 
conflicts of interest are likely to arise.  Demonstrative examples 
of these conflicts are readily seen in two cases that arose in 





137 Id. § 23-0901(3)(c)(1)(ii)(I). 
138 Id. § 23-0901(3)(f). 
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a. Correlative rights 
Oklahoma’s high court has defined correlative rights as: 
[T]hose rights which one owner possesses in a common source of 
supply in relation to those rights possessed by other owners in 
the same common source of supply . . . . [I]t must be emphasized 
that [the] common source of supply in which the owners of 
mineral interests possess correlative rights is the underlying 
geological strata . . . rather than the well through which the oil 
and gas is reduced to possession.139 
Thus as a rule, to protect the common source of supply, the State 
Commission set “allowables”—restrictions on the amount of gas 
an individual well could produce despite its potential 
productivity.  Still, in the case of Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Corp. 
Commission, the court recognized that exceptions to this rule 
were often necessary, finding  
the necessity of draining such reservoirs with a minimum of 
waste[ ] as more important than attempting to guarantee to any 
owner or operator that his permitted well or wells will produce 
the precise quantity of gas which some may predict to be in 
place under the entire surface area of his land.140   
In Sinclair, owners whose wells exhibited lesser productivity 
brought suit against the Commission for allowing owners of wells 
with greater productivity to extract gas in excess of their 
allowable share.141  The court recognized that the opposed 
interests—prevention of waste and protection of correlative 
interests—could not be reconciled without one giving ground to 
the other.  The court deemed it in the public’s best interest to 
minimize waste rather than protect owners’ rights in the profits 
of an inferior well.142 
New York’s regulatory system handles this problem deftly, at 
least as far as the interests of persons whose land is within a 
spacing unit are concerned.  Under New York law, owners share 
the proceeds from all gas recovered on a given spacing unit 
according to the percentage of land they own within that unit.  
The productivity of an individual well, or its location on one 
parcel rather than another, does not affect the amount to which 
the owners of those parcels are entitled.  Take, for example, a 
 
139 Samson Res. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 702 P.2d 19, 22 (Okla. 1985). 
140 378 P. 2d 847, 853 (Okla. 1963). 
141 Id. at 850–51. 
142 Id. at 852–53. 
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spacing unit consisting of two parcels of land of equal size.  A 
well on parcel A turns out to be incredibly productive, but 
another well on parcel B yields only modest recovery.  Under a 
system of allowables, operator A would be forced either to limit 
the amount he extracted from the productive well, or apply for an 
exemption.  In New York, owners A and B share the profits of the 
two wells equally.  When adjacent parcels are not within the 
same spacing unit, however, New York’s system is vulnerable to 
other policy conflicts. 
b. Landowners’ Rights 
It is unfortunate but likely that a policy of protecting 
individual landowner’s rights regardless of environmental waste 
will lead to disreputable, though not necessarily prohibited, 
behavior on the part of extractors.  In Texas, the recent case of 
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust143 presented just 
such a situation.  In that case, the defendant extractor owned a 
parcel of land directly adjoining another parcel on which it 
merely held a lease.144  Drilling yielded an exceptionally 
productive well on the leased parcel, recovering gas on which the 
defendant was required to pay a royalty.  It was in the 
defendant’s best interest as the owner of the adjacent parcel to 
recover as much of the gas underneath the productive well from 
the adjacent parcel as possible.  Consequently, the defendant 
drilled a number of infill wells on its own parcel as near to the 
border with the productive parcel as allowed by law.145  The 
defendant then extensively fracked the wells on its own parcel, 
causing a significant amount of the gas from the productive 
parcel to drain across the boundary to the adjacent wells.146 
One salient issue raised by Coastal Oil was whether the 
penetration by hydraulic fracturing of an adjoining parcel of land 
constitutes a trespass allowing for recovery of damages in the 
amount of the value of the gas drained.147  To resolve such an 
issue, one must first determine which policy concern—the rights 
of landowners or the prevention of waste—one wishes to prevail.  
 
143 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008). 
144 Id. at 5. 
145 Id. at 6. 
146 Id. at 7 (“[T]he frac[k]ing of the Coastal Fee No. 1 and No. 2 wells 
was . . . ‘massive’ . . . .”). 
147 Id. at 4. 
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The outcome then depends on whether one’s definition of waste is 
limited to the physical waste of the gas itself or broadened to 
include environmental waste.  The facts of Coastal Oil present 
another strong argument for the expansion of the definition of 
waste to include environmental factors other than the loss of gas.  
The amount of gas recovered would be the same whether it was 
drawn from the naturally productive parcel or the adjacent, 
heavily fracked parcel.  If one could recover the same amount of 
gas without contaminating millions of gallons of water, the use of 
that water can only be described as wasteful.148   
If the rights of landowners are to be protected fully, an 
action in trespass for such an incursion would be imperative.  
The landowner protected by such an action in a case like Coastal 
Oil would be the owner of the productive parcel, who is entitled 
to the profits from the resource trapped beneath his land.  The 
operator should not be permitted to deny those profits to the 
landowner by using fracturing to free the gas and recover it on 
the other side of a boundary.  But if instead the chief objective is 
the prevention of waste, allowing an action in trespass for 
fracking over a boundary would be counter-intuitive.  Imagine a 
situation where a high producing well could easily recover a 
greater amount of gas by extending its reach beyond a boundary 
line through fracking.  If this act were to be regarded as a 
trespass, gas that would otherwise be recoverable would be lost, 
creating waste.   
In Coastal Oil, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the 
rule of capture precluded any damages for drainage caused by 
hydraulic fracturing.149  The Court’s reasoning depended largely 
on two findings: first, that in order to recover gas from certain 
geological formations “hydraulic fracturing is not optional”; and 
second, that the practice “cannot be performed both to maximize 
reasonable commercial effectiveness and to avoid all drainage.  
Some drainage is virtually unavoidable.”150  The Texas Court 
opted to hold in favor of the greater recovery of oil and gas, but 
by relying on the rule of capture it recognized that it did so at the 
expense of landowners whose assets were drained away. 
 
148 The primary dictionary definition of “waste” is to “use or expend carelessly, 
extravagantly, or to no purpose.” Waste, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1951 
(3d ed. 2010). 
149 Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 17. 
150 Id. at 16. 
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Even had the Court reached the opposite outcome, the issue 
raised in Coastal Oil would still make clear that simultaneous 
support for these two policy positions is not tenable.  Given that 
New York’s regulations allow for the drilling of infill wells within 
330 feet of a spacing unit boundary151 and that hydraulic 
fracturing wells can extend as far as 5,000 feet,152 situations 
similar to those outlined in Coastal Oil are likely to arise.  New 
York’s legislature must provide guidance to the courts that will 
have to decide these controversies as to which policy the State 
favors.  If the State wishes to protect the rights of landowners 
regardless of potential waste, it should allow for a cause of action 
in trespass for sub-surface fracturing.  If, however, the State 
prefers the policy of achieving a greater recovery of gas while 
minimizing waste, sub-surface fracturing to achieve that 
recovery should not constitute a trespass. 
C. Rights of the General Public 
Finally, Article 23 provides for the full protection of the 
rights of “all persons including . . . the general public.”153  As the 
political entity in closest contact with any local community, the 
municipality is the body in the best position to discern the will of 
the public and defend local public interests.  As such, the power 
of local governments to determine what procedures may be 
imposed on industry to safeguard local resources must be made 
clear. 
1. Municipal Rights 
The rights of the public as they might be embodied in local 
municipalities are expressly limited by New York’s drilling 
statute.  Title 3 of Article 23 states that “[t]he provisions of this 
article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the 
regulation of the oil, gas[,] and solution mining industries,”154 but 
does not provide an explicit definition of what it means by the 
term “regulation,” particularly with regard to the term’s scope.  
Nor does the statute completely foreclose local government 
jurisdiction.  It goes on to specify that its provisions do not 
supersede “local government jurisdiction over local roads or the 
 
151 PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 22. 
152 Id. ch. 5, at 25. 
153 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2011). 
154 Id. § 23-0303(2). 
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rights of local governments under the real property tax law.”155  
By allowing some local government jurisdiction to remain intact 
and failing to define clearly which local actions are superseded, 
the legislature has left the door open for localities to challenge 
the limits on their remaining power.  Recent experience in 
Pennsylvania suggests that without more explicit statutory 
guidance, this battle will be fought in the courts. 
2. Brethren in the Marcellus: The Rights of the General Public 
in Pennsylvania 
Due to the controversial nature of hydraulic fracturing, local 
populations will most likely attempt to find a means of exerting 
influence on local drilling activities above and beyond the 
regulations imposed by State statute.  Across New York’s 
southern border in Western Pennsylvania, the hydraulic 
fracturing “gas rush” quickly created a flurry of action in 
Pennsylvania courts as various municipalities sought to enact or 
enforce local laws when drilling operations moved in.  As in New 
York, the governing statute in Pennsylvania purported to 
supersede local jurisdiction over natural gas extraction.  It read:  
“No ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the 
aforementioned acts shall contain provisions which impose 
conditions, requirements[,] or limitations on the same features of 
oil and gas well operations regulated by this act or that 
accomplish the same purposes as set forth in this act.”156 
But Pennsylvania’s attempt to supersede local jurisdiction on 
questions of drilling regulation was not perceived by the courts 
as absolute.  In Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 
Pennsylvania’s high court distinguished between provisions 
imposing conditions on a well’s function and those addressing 
only its location and found that municipalities were capable of 
enacting the latter.157  If such a distinction were to apply in New 
York, municipalities could potentially wield significant power 
over natural gas regulation, redefining the spacing provisions 
handed down by the State agency. 
New York law, as it stands, does not provide a clear 
indication of the direction courts will be likely to take.  On the 
one hand, there is Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, in which 
 
155 Id. 
156 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 (West 2011). 
157 964 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa. 2009). 
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a court shot down a local bond ordinance cloaked as a zoning 
provision and levied against drillers.158  Conversely, there is the 
more recent case of Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of 
Sardinia,159 in which the court arrived at an outcome similar to 
the function/location dichotomy of Huntley & Huntley.  In 
Gernatt, which dealt with solid mineral extraction, not gas, the 
Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether a municipality 
may use its zoning authority to eliminate mining as a permitted 
use in all of its districts.160  Title 27 of Article 23—the same 
Article that governs gas extraction—contained a supersession 
provision similar to that contained in Title 3.161  The court found 
that general regulations of land use, like zoning ordinances, “are 
not the type of regulatory provision the Legislature foresaw as 
preempted . . . ; the distinction is between ordinances that 
regulate property uses and ordinances that regulate mining 
activities.”162  The court went on to say: 
A municipality is not obliged to permit the exploitation of any 
and all natural resources within the town as a permitted use if 
limiting that use is a reasonable exercise of its police powers to 
prevent damage to the rights of others and to promote the 
interests of the community as a whole.163 
Using this reasoning, courts could easily extrapolate that Title 
3’s supersession provision, with its exception for enactments 
under the real property tax law, is similar to the one at issue in 
Gernatt and therefore “does not preempt the Town’s authority to 
determine that mining should not be a permitted use of the land 
within the Town.”164  Theoretically, then, a community that was 
opposed to the practice of hydraulic fracturing could subvert the 
DEC’s unitization and permitting process by closing off 
productive land to drilling operations.   
 
158 112 Misc. 2d 432, 435, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. 1982), aff’d, 
89 A.D.2d 1056, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (4th Dep’t 1982). 
159 87 N.Y.2d 668, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 642 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1996). 
160 Id. at 681, 664 N.E.2d at 1234, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 172. 
161 Id. at 682, 664 N.E.2d at 1234–35, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 172–73; see also N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-2703(2)(b) (McKinney 2011) (“[T]his title shall supersede 
all other state and local laws relating to the extractive mining industry; provided, 
however, that nothing in this title shall be construed to prevent any local 
government from . . . enacting or enforcing local zoning ordinances or laws which 
determine permissible uses in zoning districts.”). 
162 Gernatt, 87 N.Y.2d at 681–82, 664 N.E.2d at 1234, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 172. 
163 Id. at 684, 664 N.E.2d at 1235, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 173. 
164 Id. at 683, 664 N.E.2d at 1235, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 173. 
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A New York municipality might also attempt to circumvent 
Article 23’s supersession clause by exploiting its exception for 
jurisdiction over local roads.  On this subject, a recent Texas case 
is instructive.  In Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean 
Water v. Railroad Commission,165 the Court of Appeals found that 
the state regulatory agency’s focus “only on the increased 
recovery of oil and gas” was “too narrow a view of ‘the public 
interest.’ ”166  The court required the agency to consider the 
locality’s position on heavy truck traffic on small, rural roads as 
being contrary to the public interest.167  The Texas Supreme 
Court subsequently overruled.168  The court found that the 
statute’s use of the term “public interest” was ambiguous, 
entitling the agency’s construction of that term to deference.169  
These discordant opinions highlight the ambiguity in New York’s 
statute and the need for legislative clarification.  If New York’s 
regulatory agency or courts were to adopt a broad interpretation 
of the rights of the general public referred to in Article 23, a 
municipality could properly use its local road jurisdiction to 
prohibit heavy truck traffic on the roads within a spacing unit.  
This would effectively deprive the permit-holder of the supplies 
necessary to conduct operations and prevent either drilling or 
fracking to go forward.   
Whether it is through a land-use prohibition or strict traffic 
controls, municipal power might readily bring the protection of 
the rights of the general public directly into opposition with the 
policy aim of achieving a greater recovery of natural gas.  Unless 
the legislature addresses what, specifically, the scope of Article 
23’s supersession clause covers and what power remains in the 
hands of local governments, these questions will be wrestled with 
in courts on a case by case basis.  The time that thwarted 
extractors will be forced to spend bogged down in litigation with 
whole counties or individual townships is time they might 
otherwise spend producing energy resources for the people of 
New York. 
 
165 254 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. 2007), rev’d, 336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011). 
166 Id. at 498. 
167 Id. at 502. 
168 R.R. Comm’n v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 
619 (Tex. 2011). 
169 Id. at 628–29. 
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III. RESOLUTION/PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES 
This Section offers a series of discrete solutions to the issues 
raised in the analysis above. 
A. A More Inclusive Definition of “Waste” 
First and foremost, in light of the unique situation of New 
York’s shale beds in the midst of vital environmental resources, 
the legislature should amend Article 23’s definition of waste to 
include more than just the loss of potential gas production.  If the 
definition as it currently stands is meant to include more than 
this limited understanding of waste, its language is not 
sufficiently specific to make that clear.   
The statutory definition of the term waste should be 
amended to incorporate the broader understanding of the term 
evidenced in the prdSGEIS.170  It should include environmental 
waste and the waste products subject to regulatory disposal 
standards.  These include cuttings from drilling, pit liners, solid 
residuals, and, most importantly, flowback or produced water.171  
As written, Article 23 fails to address any type of environmental 
waste.  A complete balancing of the various policy aims of the 
Article requires that environmental waste be considered in 
addition to the actual loss of gas or the diminishment of potential 
recovery.  The statute should be amended to reflect this 
additional consideration. 
B. Correlative Rights & The Rights of Landowners 
1. Compulsory Integration 
a. Amendment of Article 23’s Policy Aims 
The legislature should amend the policy provisions of Article 
23 to more accurately reflect that in practice the rights of 
landowners are subservient to the State’s interest in achieving a 
greater recovery of gas.  The mechanism of compulsory 
integration, where a landowner may decide only how her land 
will be integrated, not whether it will be integrated, casts this 
contradiction into sharp relief.172  A statute that allows for land 
 
170 See PRDSGEIS, supra note 26, ch. 5, at 130–34.  
171 See id. 
172 See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
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to be compulsorily integrated but simultaneously claims to 
protect the rights of landowners is at best disingenuous.  The 
clause containing the claim should either be removed or language 
should be added to clarify that the landowners’ rights are 
protected only to the extent that the landowner is entitled to 
recover a proportional royalty of revenue derived from use of her 
land under the correlative rights doctrine. 
Alternatively, if the legislature wishes sincerely to preserve 
the policy aim of protecting the rights of landowners, the practice 
of compulsory integration must be done away with.  Among the 
rights that landowners possess in their land is the right to keep 
that land free from industrial drilling.173  If the State wishes to 
preserve that right, it cannot compel owners to allow drilling on 
or under their land, regardless of the interest of the State in 
greater recovery. 
b. The Rights of Operators on Integrated Land 
If the practice of compulsory integration is to continue, the 
legislature must specify what rights operators have over 
integrated land.  Under the terms of the statute at present, 
operators could conceivably conduct more than subsurface 
intrusions on an integrated property.  The statute does not 
explicitly prohibit an integrated property being subjected to 
surface disturbances.  As such, an unwilling landowner’s 
property might be used for storage of produced water, storage in 
open pits of cuttings contaminated with chemical additives, truck 
access, parking, or even actual drilling.  A court finding that the 
statute allows such activities could deny the landowner any 
recourse.174 
As of this writing, no incidents of surface disturbance of 
integrated land have been recorded.  Once the moratorium on 
hydraulic fracturing in the state is lifted, however, and drilling 
activities increase, private sector operators will be looking to 
 
173 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (characterizing the right to exclude as the “hallmark of a 
protected property interest”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 3–4, 8 (1990); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information 
Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (“American 
courts and commentators have deemed the ‘right to exclude’ foremost among the 
property rights, with . . . leading property scholars describing the right as the core, 
or the essential element, of ownership.”). 
174 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
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maximize their profits.  Rather than wait for a transgression—or 
a series of transgressions—to reveal the extent of the gap in the 
statutory language, the legislature should address the question 
of what rights permit-holders have over integrated land before 
the moratorium on fracking is lifted. 
2. Subsurface Fracturing and the Issue of Trespass 
To save the issue of whether subsurface fracturing 
constitutes a trespass from a long and arduous period of 
litigation, the legislature must specify which policy aim it values 
more highly: landowners’ rights or the prevention of waste in 
achieving the greater recovery of gas.  If the legislature 
addresses that question, resolving the trespass issue is simple.  If 
landowners’ rights are to be paramount, any subsurface 
incursion by fracking should be considered a trespass and the 
owner should be entitled to recover for the gas extracted from his 
land by fracking.  If, however, the greater recovery of gas is to 
prevail, subsurface incursion by fracking should not constitute a 
trespass so long as it is done to minimize waste.175  Given the 
high environmental impact of the practice, the New York 
legislature should adopt the latter approach. 
C. Rights of the General Public: A Clear Standard of Local 
Authority 
Finally, the legislature should amend Article 23 to provide 
local governments with a clear, definitive standard of the 
jurisdiction they retain under the Article’s supersession clause.  
The legislature could avoid much confusion and a great deal of 
litigation simply by defining the term “regulation” in that clause, 
clearly delineating what powers remain available to local 
authorities.  In light of the outcomes of Huntley & Huntley in 
Pennsylvania’s high court and Garnatt in New York’s, lawmakers 
should anticipate that many municipalities will likely attempt to 
regulate the location of drilling activities and the traffic to and 
from drilling sites.  In some communities, these regulations may 
be so strict as to amount to a prohibition on fracking.  If it is the 
legislature’s intention to grant local governments that power, an 
amendment clarifying that intention will be helpful for both local 
governments and the courts who are certain to hear the 
 
175 See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
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industry’s inevitable challenges to such restrictions.  If 
lawmakers do not wish for municipalities to have that power, an 
amendment stating as much will deter improper attempts at 
local regulation and prevent the majority of those challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
New York’s system of regulating the process of hydraulic 
fracturing under the Mineral Resources Law is both thorough 
and comprehensive.  The system’s flaw lies in attempting to 
achieve policy goals that bear inherent contradictions.  Because 
of the highly controversial nature of the subject, regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing will continue to receive a great deal of 
attention as the moratorium on the practice is lifted.  With 
modest effort, New York’s legislature can correct a number of the 
law’s internal contradictions and anticipate issues that are likely 
to arise.  The discrete amendments to Article 23 suggested above 
will save an untold amount of time and resources otherwise 
certain to be expended by administrative agencies, courts, and 
the private sector.  Given the State’s interests in developing its 
gas fields and preserving its environmental resources, New 
York’s legislature should not hesitate to act. 
 
